tendency to fire high. Tactics are simple, usually an advance in strength or the investment or defence of small forts or houses. Any more complicated manœuvre involving strict timing or detailed concerted action would be beyond their capacity at present. They are difficult to control in action, and in the heat of the moment tend to forget their training and to expose themselves by not making use of ground and cover, but as their potential opponents suffer from the same faults this is not so serious as it would be against more experienced troops. The Bedouin does not favour night-fighting, but he is expert at moving and taking up position in the dark. He is willing to follow his officers, and has particular faith in those from the Arab Legion, who in simple fashion he believes must be more competent, as they have been brought in from another country. The same would apply to British officers, provided they understood his language and customs and accurately gauged his capabilities. Unless equipped with this knowledge, however, a British officer would find the Bedouin soldier awkward to handle and disappointing in action.

By showing promise and industry the soldier will gain promotion or can become a specialist such as wireless operator or armourer. At present the highest rank reached by any is lieutenant; owing to lack of experience, knowledge, and background, they are not yet suitable for higher rank, but in time this will be overcome. Part of the remedy may result from the foundation a few years ago of a Bedouin boys' school in Mukalla. This worth-while enterprise, sponsored and paid for by His Majesty's Government, is of considerable interest, and it is anticipated that ex-pupils will not only help to fill the ranks of H.B.L. with good material, but that others, encouraged to further education, will become much-needed Government servants, teachers and leaders in other walks of life.

There is a cadre of men who have voluntarily remained in the H.B.L. for longer periods, but after four years or so the average soldier, unless he has attained rank, will retire. He may ask that his place be taken by his brother or cousin, as he has liked the life, and his length of voluntary service speaks for itself. On his return to his tribe he will be an asset to Government, and his understanding and experience will be of help to political officers or other Government servants who may have dealings with his tribe or work to perform in his area. There is no reserve. The Bedouin in the Protectorate dislikes being tied down to a peiod of time, and a reserve as understood in a European army would be impossible to administer or co-ordinate. But in an emergency many ex-soldiers would return for temporary service if strongly requested.

Whatever the future may hold, there is no doubt that the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion performs useful tasks at low costs. It is in no sense planned as a national army, but in its military and political rôles has fully justified itself. One hopes that its ties with the Arab Legion will not be broken and that in the years to come it will attain the prestige and success in its own area which the Arab Legion enjoys in the Arab world as a whole.

I am indebted to Major I. E. Snell, Royal Sussex Regiment, at present seconded as Military Adviser to the British Agent, Mukalla for certain facts and technical details used in this article.

22: Reilly G-3 (1933-41) 1941 MM2 Hadhramaut MM2

houses whose semi-Malayan architecture contrasts forcibly with the austere and simple lines of the buildings of native Arab design. These well-to-do people have seen the benefits of law and order in foreign countries, but they found themselves powerless to introduce them among the warring tribes of the Hadhramaut. The country thus presented a strange intermixture of civilized opulence and tribal turmoil. It was at length realized by themselves that these evils could be cured only by foreign intervention, and they appealed insistently to the Protecting Power to interfere. The situation was complicated by the political division of the country between the Quaiti Sultan of Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun, whose traditional jealousies added to the general confusion.

It was evident to the British authorities that the whole problem presented by this part of the Protectorate needed careful examination before any effective action could be taken by the British Government, and Mr. W. H. Ingrams was deputed by the Colonial Office to study it. His very valuable report formed the basis on which British policy in the country has since been developed, and his appointment as Resident Adviser to the Quaiti and Kathiri Sultans opened a new chapter in the history of the country. Backed by the strength of the Royal Air Force, whose timely punishment of a notoriously lawless tribe gave general satisfaction, he was able to negotiate a network of truces which brought to an end the internecine warfare that was ruining the land, and with the assistance of a small but energetic political staff he was able to inaugurate reforms that are bringing order out of chaos in the Quaiti and Kathiri States. Mr. Ingrams is now Chief Secretary at Aden, but his work in the Eastern Aden Protectorate is being continued by his successor at Mukalla, Mr. Joy.

In the western half of the Protectorate there was not the same demand for reform, because there was no correspondingly large section of the community with wealth and culture and an acquaintance with the advantages of regular and orderly government. Progress has therefore been slower, but the efforts of the British Government to promote peace and internal security have been ably assisted by our loyal friend the Sultan of Lahej, the premier chief of the Protectorate.

The patient work of Colonel M. C. Lake, the Political Secretary at Aden, and of the political officers under his direction has borne fruit in a general amelioration of conditions, and the creation of Government and tribal guards to supplement air control has helped in establishing security on the trade routes and in bringing peace to districts that had long been distracted by blood feuds and brigandage.